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We evaluate the degree of gradualism and inaction in UK monetary policy over the Monetary 
Policy Committee (MPC) period (1997-2007) at the quarterly and the monthly frequency. After 
accounting for misspecification in standard Taylor rules, we find little evidence for gradualism. A 
measure of optimal policy is calculated. Comparing this with actual policy suggests that there is 
less inaction in monetary policy decisions than previous work suggested for the period prior to 
the formation of the MPC. In an analysis of the MPC's monthly voting decisions, we find that the 
activity rate, defined as the probability that the MPC vote to change interest rates in a given 
month, has fallen over time. This reflects the increased stability of inflation and output growth, 
rather than changes in the degree of gradualism and/or inaction. There is some evidence for 
inaction at the monthly frequency however, demonstrated by the fact that the MPC is more active 
in the forecast month than in the non-forecast month. The MPC also tends to wait longer before 
reversing the direction of interest rate changes than continuing them. This difference appears not 
to be driven by gradualism, and so provides further evidence for inaction at the monthly 
frequency. A panel data analysis suggests that the MPC as a whole is equally active as its 
individual members, so inaction appears not to be driven by the use of a committee to set 
monetary policy. There is no evidence that activity rates fall with the length of time that a 
member has served on the committee, suggesting that learning about the transmission mechanism 
has no impact on the tendency for gradualism and inaction. 
2Summary
This paper investigates the evidence for gradualism and inaction in UK monetary policy since
the establishment of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC). We deﬁne gradualism as the
tendency for the central bank to move interest rates in many small steps, rather than fewer larger
steps, and inaction as the tendency to delay the decision to change the interest rate, perhaps to
wait for more data.
The ﬁrst part of the paper investigates the evidence for gradualism and inaction in the quarterly
data. Although previous work suggests that monetary policy responds gradually to movements in
inﬂation and the output gap, there is strong evidence that these models omit some important
variables or are speciﬁed incorrectly. We adapt the models and ﬁnd little evidence for
gradualism in UK monetary policy over the MPC period.
To evaluate whether there is any evidence for inaction we estimate a measure of monetary policy
when there is no incentive for the MPC to reduce interest rate volatility and compare it with
actual monetary policy. Although there is some evidence that monetary policy has been inert
over the MPC period, we ﬁnd markedly less evidence for inaction than previous work suggests.
This may reﬂect the fact that earlier work looked at monetary policy prior to the formation of the
MPC, when both inﬂation and output were considerably more volatile. In line with the results
from the previous section this exercise provides little evidence that policy has been more gradual
than it should have been at the quarterly frequency given the dynamics of the economy.
The second part of the paper considers whether there is any evidence for inaction in the monthly
data as this is the frequency at which moneta r yp o l i c yd e c i s i o n sa r em a d ei nt h eU K .W eﬁnd that
the activity rate, deﬁned as the probability that the MPC vote to change the interest rate at a given
monetary policy meeting, has fallen over the sample period, though this entirely reﬂects the
increase in the stability of output growth and inﬂation rather than the Committee becoming more
inactive. However, we ﬁnd some evidence of inaction in the tendency for the MPC to be more
active in the quarterly forecast round. This tendency has increased over time, and this increase
does not appear to be driven by increased economic stability. We also ﬁnd evidence for inaction
in the tendency of the MPC to wait longer before making an interest rate change which reverses
the direction of the previous movement than one which maintains it. This trend is in line with
3ﬁn d i n g si nt h eq u a r t e r l yd a t a ,a n dc o m m o nt oo t h er central banks with similar monetary policy
frameworks.
In addition, we take advantage of the publication of individual MPC member voting records to
analyse whether trends in the activity rate are related to the use of a committee (rather than
individual) as a decision making body. There is no evidence that the MPC is less active than its
individual members, though we do ﬁnd differences in the voting patterns of internal and external
members. In particular, external members tend to be somewhat more active than the internal
members, despite the fact that internal members are more likely to act in response to deviations
of the inﬂation forecast from target.
41I n t r o d u c t i o n
It has been long noted that central banks tend to move interest rates gradually, making a series of
small changes in one direction, rather than a larger single step change. This tendency is
demonstrated in Chart 1, and results in the path of interest rates being smoother, and interest rate
changes being smaller and more frequent, than some standard models of monetary policy would
predict.
This type of behaviour has been rationalised in a number of different ways. The key argument
refers to uncertainty about how much the economy will respond to a given interest rate change,
due to parameter uncertainty (Brainard (1967).1 However, the idea that uncertainty should
increase gradualism is not a general principle, but depends on the type of uncertainty facing the
policy maker, and the shocks hitting the economy.2 Another reason for gradualism results from
uncertainty about the most recent economic data – the element of noise, relative to news, in early
data can motivate a gradual response to changes in the economy (Orphanides (1998) and Aoki
(2002)). Woodford (1999) also shows that it may be optimal for central banks to act gradually in
order to be able to inﬂuence private sector expectations of future short-term rates, and thus
long-term interest rates. Blinder (1997), ﬁnally, suggested that interest rates may respond only
gradually to news because of the inertia generated by a committee-based decision-making
process. The idea is that it may take time to build a consensus in a committee for an interest rate
move.
Another feature that seems to characterise central banks is that of inaction, or delay, as captured
by the fact that for most central banks, the average length of time before a policy reversal exceeds
that before a policy continuation. To justify this type of inaction, there must be some cost
involved in reversing the decision. One potential cost is that commentators might see reversals as
reﬂecting indecisions or incompetence. Another could be that if interest rates are reversed
frequently, the link between short-term and long-term interest rates could be weakened, which
would reduce the central bank’s ability to control inﬂation.3 Little theoretical work has been done
1Sack (1998) and Martin and Salmon (1999) provide empirical results which suggest that parameter uncertainty can account for some of
the gradualism in actual interest rates in the United States and the United Kingdom.
2For example, Soderstrom (2002) ﬁnds that uncertainty about the degree of inﬂation persistence makes the optimal monetary policy less
gradual. Leitemo and Soderstrom (2004) show that when there is uncertainty about the size of shocks, a central bank that wants to be
robust against particularly bad outcomes will respond more aggressively to shocks hitting inﬂation.
3Woodford (1999) argues that gradualism helps communicate a credible committment to a changed future path of short-term rates, hence
increases the pass-through of monetary policy to long-term rates. At the other end of the scale frequent policy reversals suggest that the
policy maker has little committment to any future path of short-term rates reducing this pass-through.
5on inaction and monetary policy, but a recent paper by Ellison (2006) argues that there is a
learning cost involved in interest rate reversals, since frequently reversing the interest rate makes
learning about the key features of the monetary policy transmission mechanism more difﬁcult.
Some recent studies, ﬁnally, have questioned the evidence in favour of gradualism and/or
inaction. Rudebush (2002) and Gerlach-Kristen (2004) argue that some of the evidence for
gradualism in Taylor rules for the United States arises spuriously when central banks respond to
unobserved variables that exhibit some persistence. Goodhart (2005) estimates Taylor rules using
published forecasts for inﬂation and output growth for the UK, ﬁnding little evidence of
gradualism or inaction in monetary policy; interest rates are changed whenever the inﬂation
forecast deviates from target with no evidence for deliberate gradualism or inaction in the
policy-decision.
This paper evaluates the degree of gradualism and inaction in UK monetary policy, focusing on
the period since 1997 when the Bank of England was granted independence and the Monetary
Policy Committee (MPC) was formed (the MPC period). We deﬁne gradualism as the tendency
for the central bank to move interest rates in many small steps, rather than in one large change.
Gradualism, therefore, results in serial correlation in the interest rate, even after controlling for
lags in the transmission mechanism. We deﬁne inaction as the tendency for central bank to delay
the decision to change interest rates, for example to wait for more data.
In the ﬁrst part of the paper, we use quarterly data to estimate Taylor rules. The main conclusion
is that, over the MPC period, there is little evidence for gradualism on a quarterly frequency once
we account for model misspeciﬁcation. To evaluate whether there is any evidence for inaction we
calculate an estimate of policy when there is no incentive for the MPC to reduce interest rate
volatility to use as a reference point. We do this by estimating a structural VAR and solving for
the optimal monetary policy under the assumption that interest rates are set to minimise a
weighted sum of inﬂation and output variability only. The main result is that, although there is
some evidence that monetary policy has been inert over the MPC period, there is markedly less
inaction than previous work suggested.4 This may reﬂect the fact that earlier work studied
monetary policy prior to the formation of the MPC, when both inﬂation and output were
considerably more volatile. In line with the Taylor rule results, this exercise also suggests that
there is little evidence that policy has been more gradual than it should be, given the dynamics of
4As reported by Martin and Salmon (1999) and Goodhart (1999).
6the economy.
The focus of the second part of the paper is to use published voting records for the period
1997-2007 to analyse the evidence for inaction and gradualism at the monthly frequency. We ﬁnd
that the activity rate, deﬁned as the probability that the committee vote to change interest rates in
a given monetary policy meeting, has fallen over time. This fall appears entirely to reﬂect the
increased stability of inﬂation and output growth since the mid-1990s, rather than changes in the
degree of gradualism and/or inaction. There is some evidence for inaction at the monthly
frequency however, reﬂected by the fact that the MPC is more active in the forecast month than
in the non-forecast month. The importance of the forecast round has also increased over time,
and this increase appears not to be related to increased economic stability. There is no evidence
that the MPC waits longer before a rate rise than a rate cut, though there is evidence that it tends
to wait longer before reversing the direction of interest rate changes. This difference appears not
to be driven by interest rate gradualism, and so provides some further evidence for inaction at the
monthly frequency.
We also use the panel data properties of the voting records of the individual members to analyse
differences in activity rates across members, and compare individual voting patterns to that of the
committee as a whole. There is no evidence that the MPC is less active than its individual
members, contrary to the theory suggested by Blinder (1997). External members tend to be more
active than internal ones, despite the fact that internal members respond more strongly to
deviations of the inﬂation forecast from target. Internals also tend to be more active before an
interest rate rise, compared to a cut. There is no evidence that activity rates are falling with the
length of time that a member has served on the committee, suggesting that learning about the
transmission mechanism has no impact on the tendency for gradualism and inaction.
The paper is organised in the following way. Section 2 investigates the evidence for gradualism
in UK interest rates at the quarterly frequency using Taylor rules, and a simulation of policy
when there is no incentive for the MPC to reduce interest rate volatility. Section 3 uses monthly
voting data to analyse the evidence for inaction and gradualism at the monthly frequency, both
for the MPC as a whole and its individual members. Section 4, ﬁnally, concludes.
72 Inaction and gradualism at the quarterly frequency
In this section, we look at the data on a quarterly frequency and ask two questions: Is there
evidence for gradualism in monetary policy, and is there evidence for inaction? To evaluate
whether monetary policy has been gradual, we start by estimating Taylor rules, accounting for
some estimation issues that have been discussed in the recent literature. To evaluate whether
there is any evidence for inaction we need some measure of alternative policy, as a reference
point. We calculate a measure of monetary policy when there is no incentive to reduce interest
rate volatility and compare this with actual monetary policy to see whether there is any evidence
that interest rates have not responded to shocks sufﬁciently quickly.
2.1 Evidence from Taylor rules
2.1.1 Standard Taylor rules
We estimate the following Taylor rule,
it = i
∗ + φππt + φyyt (1)
where it is the nominal interest rate, i∗ a measure of the equilibrium nominal interest rate, πt
annual inﬂation, and yt a measure of the output gap. We use quarterly data on the ofﬁcial policy
rate, RPIX and CPI inﬂation, and a measure of the output gap, for the period 1976Q1-2007Q2.5
We test whether any of these variables are non-stationary, and reject the hypothesis of a unit root
in the output gap and the various measures of inﬂation over 1976-2006. For the nominal interest
rate, the results are sensitive to the length of the sample period, and the speciﬁcation of the test.
S i n c et h ep o w e ro ft h i st e s ti sl o ww h e nt h es a m p l ei ss m a l lw ea s s u m et h a tit is stationary.6
Column 1 in Table 1 (at the end of the paper) show st h er e s u l t sf r o mt h eb a s e l i n er e g r e s s i o n ,
estimated using RPIX inﬂation, over the full sample period. The estimated coefﬁcients are
positive and signiﬁcant.7 There is, however, strong evidence of serial correlation in the residual,
suggesting model misspeciﬁcation. One potential explanation for this is that changes in the
5The output gap is constructed as detrended whole-economy output, where a HP ﬁlter is used to detrend the data.
6The argument is that the nominal interest rate cannot have a unit root when both the real rate (for theoretical reasons) and inﬂation are
stationary.
7We also ﬁnd that the estimated Taylor rule does not fulﬁl the Taylor principle that states that the coefﬁcient on inﬂation should be
greater than one. This means that over the period as a whole, monetary policy seems to have failed to provide a nominal anchor for the
economy, in line with ﬁndings in Nelson (2000).
8monetary policy regime are not properly captured by this model. We instead focus on the period
1997-2007 (the MPC period), as reported in column 2. The estimated coefﬁcient on inﬂation is
now greater than one, but there is still strong serial correlation in the residual. Another issue is
the switch from a RPIX target to a CPI target at the end of 2003. We construct an inﬂation
measure that is deﬁned as the deviation of the target measure of inﬂation from its target (RPIX
until 2003Q4 and CPI thereafter), with regression results reported in column 3. The ﬁto ft h e
model is slightly better, but there is still evidence of misspeciﬁcation.
C o l u m n s4 - 5i nT a b l e1r e p o r tt h er e s u l t sw h e nt h el a g g e di n t e r e s tr a t ei si n c l u d e di nt h e
regression, for the whole sample, and for the inﬂation targeting period,
it = i





We ﬁnd little evidence of serial correlation in the residual when the model is estimated over the
whole sample (column 4). The estimated coefﬁcient on the lagged interest rate is 0.93, which
implies a mean lag of 13 quarters.8 This suggests that three years after a shock to inﬂation or
output, only half of the adjustment of the policy rate to its optimal level is completed. There is
less evidence of gradualism for the MPC period, with a mean lag of around 7 quarters (column
5). However, there is still strong evidence of misspeciﬁcation, such that the Taylor rule with a
role for interest rate gradualism is rejected by the data for the MPC period.9
2.1.2 Allowing for model misspeciﬁcation
Under an inﬂation targeting framework, policy-making is forward-looking and aims at stabilising
inﬂation around target at the relevant time horizon. In this case, the Taylor rule speciﬁed in (1) or
(2) can be thought of as a reduced-form relation, where current inﬂation and output enter the
reaction function of the central bank since they are predetermined variables that, in equilibrium,
determine expectations about future inﬂation and output. As shown by Svensson (2003) however,
a current-value Taylor rule is unlikely to be a soluti o nt ot h ec e n t r a lb a n k ’ s optimisation problem
if there are important state variables other than inﬂation and the output gap. This means that the
simple Taylor rule may suffer from omitted variables, in which case the estimated coefﬁcients
tend to be biased. In addition, if the omitted variables are serially correlated, this could give
8The mean lag, deﬁned as the time it takes before half of the adjustment of interest rates to movements in inﬂation or the output gap has
been made, is given by ρ/(1 − ρ) quarters. Since the partial adjustment model is only valid when ρ<1, we also test the hypothesis that
ρ = 1. This hypothesis is rejected.
9We test for serial correlation in the residual using the Ljung-Box Q statistics, where we include 8 lags in the test speciﬁcation. The null
hypothesis of no serial correlation is rejected at all lags.
9spurious evidence for interest rate gradualism, as pointed out by Rudebusch (2002). Another
issue is that the standard Taylor rule is estimated on ﬁnal output data, whereas policy-makers
only have access to real-time data on output. If this is not properly accounted for, this may
spuriously give a role for lagged interest rates in the Taylor rule.10
One way to deal with measurement issues is to try to account for them in the empirical
speciﬁcation of the Taylor rule.11 Let yt|t denote the output gap in period t, as perceived by
policy-makers in period t, and let yt denote the ﬁnal estimate of the output gap. Assume that
policy-makers follow a Taylor rule of the following form
it = i
∗ + φππt + φyyt|t (3)
The estimated Taylor rule can then be expressed as
it = i







Since the residual ut is correlated with the explanatory variables, OLS gives biased estimates of
the model parameters. To control for this, the model is estimated using an instrumental variable
approach, as shown in column 6 in Table 1.12 We ﬁnd, however, that the results are similar to
those obtained using OLS.
Recent work by Rudebusch (2002) and Gerlach-Kristen (2004) on US data argue that the role for
lagged interest rates in the Taylor rule arises partly because policy-makers respond to (for the
econometrician) unobserved variables, which exhibit some persistence. An alternative
interpretation is that serially correlated data revisions give rise to persistent errors in the estimated
Taylor rule.13 In the model described by (3)-(4), this would imply serial correlation in ut.
10See Aoki (2002) for a model with noisy data and interest rate gradualism.
11Another way to account for this would be to estimate the Taylor rule using real-time data on the output gap. We do so, and ﬁnd that the
results are similar to those obtained using ﬁnal data. This may reﬂect the fact that policy-makers know that some of the data will get
revised, and therefore may not take the real-time data at face value. Instead, one would have to recreate a measure of the output gap, as
perceived by the policy-makers (see eg Nelson and Nikolov (2001)).
12We use lag 1-4 of inﬂation, the output gap and the interest rate, as instruments. To avoid weak identiﬁcation, the instruments need to be
correlated with the explanatory variables πt and yt. We use the partial R2 statistics by Shea (1997), to assess instrument weakness. The
statistics are high for both variables, suggesting that the instruments are sufﬁciently correlated with both model variables (partial R2
equals 0.56 for πt a n d0 . 6 7f o ryt).
13There is strong evidence of serial correlation in the data revisions. As a measure of the size of revisions, we use the difference between
the output gap constructed using the ﬁnal estimate of output, compare to the initial estimate, where the ﬁnal estimate is constructed using
data released in October 2006. The revisions are serially correlated, with a correlation coefﬁcient of 0.9 between yt − yt|t and
yt−1 − yt−1|t−1.
10We account for unobserved factors that exhibit persistence by specifying the following Taylor
rule:
it = i
∗ + (1 − ρ)
b
φππt + φyyt + φzzt
c
+ ρit−1 (6)
zt = γzt−1 + vt (7)
where zt is an unobservable factor that policy-makers respond to, and γ captures the degree of
persistence in this factor. Variable vt is assumed to be white noise. We can rewrite (6) as
it = i




+ ρit−1 + εt (8)
εt = (1 − ρ)φzzt = γεt−1 + vt (9)
If the true model is given by (6)-(7), but we estimate the standard Taylor-rule in (8),t h er e s i d u a l
will be serially correlated.
Combining (8) and (9) gives
it = (1 − γ)i
∗ + (1 − ρ)
d
φπ (πt − γπt−1) + φy (yt − γ yt−1)
e
+ (ρ + γ)it−1 − ργit−2 +˜ vt
(10)
where the residual ˜ vt = (1 − ρ)φzvt is white noise. Equation (10) can be estimated using OLS,
as reported in in columns 7-8 in Table 1.14 By comparing column 7 with column 4, we see that
allowing for unobserved variables does not have a big impact on the results over the full sample;
The estimated coefﬁcient on the lagged interest is 0.9, which implies a mean lag of 9 quarters,
compared to 13 quarters in the baseline estimation. But allowing for unobserved variables during
the MPC period greatly reduces the implied degree of interest rate gradualism, by reducing the
m e a nl a gf r o m7q u a r t e r st o1 . 6q u a r t e r s( c o l u m n8c o m p a r e dt oc o l u m n5i nT a b l e1 ) .W ea l s o
ﬁnd that there is a high degree of serial correlation in the unobservable component over the MPC
period. This means that deviations of the actual interest rate from that predicted by the standard
Taylor rule are persistent. In a model which does not allow for unobservable components, this
would be picked up as evidence for interest rate gradualism. By contrast, in our model it suggests
that policy-makers are responding to variables not well captured by a standard Taylor rule.
One issue is that it is difﬁcult to identify and estimate partial adjustment models in the presence
of serially correlated shocks. This was pointed out by Blinder (1986) in the context of an
inventory model, who stressed that there has to be sufﬁcient variations in the dependent variable
to allow identiﬁcation of the partial adjustment (ρ) and the serial correlation (γ) parameters. To
14We also estimate (8) and (9) using a Kalman ﬁlter, which gives similar results to those reported in Table 1.
11analyse whether γ and ρ are uniquely identiﬁed in our model, we estimate a reduced-form
version of (10),
it = μ1 + μ2πt + μ3πt−1 + μ4yt + μ5yt−1 + μ6it−1 + μ7it−2 +˜ vt (11)
















2 = 0.96 (12)
where standard deviations are reported within parenthesis, and where the reduced-form
parameters are related to the Taylor-rule parameters according to
μ1 = i
∗ (1 − γ),μ 2 = (1 − ρ)φπ,μ 3 =−(1 − ρ)φπγ, (13)
μ4 = (1 − ρ)φy,μ 5 =−(1 − ρ)φyγ, μ 6 = ρ + γ, μ 7 =− ργ.
We can combine the expressions for μ6 and μ7 (the coefﬁcients on lagged interest rates) to get a
second-order equation for γ, which means that we cannot rule out the existence of two solutions
for γ and ρ – one in which there is little serial correlation in the residual, but strong gradualism,
and one in which there is less gradualism, but strong serial correlation. While the response of the
interest rate to inﬂation is insigniﬁcant (captured by μ2 and μ3) , the estimated response to the
output gap is signiﬁcant (μ4 and μ5). By combining the expressions for μ4 and μ5 using (13),w e
are able to pin down a unique solution for γ and ρ.Thus, since changes in the output gap are
associated with sufﬁcient variation in the interest rate, we are able to obtain fairly precise
estimates of γ and ρ.15 For the MPC period, this solution implies a high degree of serial
correlation in the unobservable component, and a lower degree of correlation in the interest rate
rule.16 In particular, the results suggest that the mean lag for the policy rate over the MPC period
is less than 2 quarters.
15In a similar context, this was also found by English, Nelson and Sack (2003).
16We also look at the relation between the unobservable component and some variables that, ap r i o r i ,c o u l db ec a p t u r e db yt h e
unobserved variable components. We ﬁn dt h a tam e a s u r eo fﬁnancial market conditions, as proxied by the equity risk premia for the
FTSE 100, and a measure of data revisions together can account for around 70% of the variations in the unobservable component. In
particular, when the equity risk premium is high, the interest rate is lower than predicted from a Taylor rule regression. When output data
has been revised up compared to the initial release, interest rates are lower than predicted from a Taylor rule regression based on the ﬁnal
data.
122.1.3 Forward-looking policy
As discussed above, one reason for why we found evidence for model misspeciﬁcation above is
that, when actual policy is forward-looking, the current-value Taylor rule is a reduced-form
equation that is likely to be misspeciﬁed when the policy-maker uses a large number of state
variables to form expectations about the future. One way to get around this problem is to
estimate a forward-looking policy rule directly,
it = i





where Etπt+τ and Etyt+τ denote expectations about inﬂation and the output gap τ quarters ahead.
The challenge in estimating (14) is that expectations are not readily available. There are two
main approaches to get proxies for expectations – to use future values of inﬂation and the output
gap, and to use actual forecast data. Work by Nelson (2000) and Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998)
among others use actual realisations of inﬂation and the output gap τ quarters ahead to proxy
expectations. Under the assumption of rational expectations, actual realisations of the variables
can be used to proxy expectations, and an instrumental variable approach can be used to estimate
the model. We follow this approach and estimate a forward-looking Taylor rule, with the results
s h o w ni nT a b l e2 ,f o rv a l u e so fτ =− 1 (lagged speciﬁcation) to τ = 4, focusing on the period
1994-2006.17
The estimated response to inﬂation is increasing in the horizon while the response to the output
gap falls with the horizon, which was also found in Orphanides (2001). However, the estimated
parameter values are very uncertain, and not signiﬁcant at horizons over 3 quarters. The
estimated degree of gradualism varies between 0.86 to 0.90, which is similar to the results
r e p o r t e di nT a b l e1 .
However, one drawback of this approach is that the forecasts are conditional on the interest rate
path. If the central bank is able to control inﬂation perfectly, the resulting low variability of
inﬂation may lead to insigniﬁcant estimates of the policy response to expected (ie future)
inﬂation. Since 1994, UK inﬂation has indeed been very stable around the inﬂation target, as
documented by eg Benati (2004). Recent work by Orphanides (2001), Boivin (2005) and
Goodhart (2005) uses actual forecasts of inﬂation and output growth instead, these are
17W ee x t e n dt h es a m p l et o1 9 9 4s i n c et h es a m p l ep e r i o dw o u l do t h e r w i s eb ev e r ys h o r t .
13constructed under the assumption that the nominal interest rate will remain constant within the
forecasting horizon.18
Goodhart (2005) points out that the inﬂation and output forecasts published by the UK MPC
which are conditional on a constant interest rate assumption also incorporate the preceding
interest rate decision. If the MPC believes it is entirely successful in bringing inﬂation back to
target at the relevant forecast horizon, the constant-rate inﬂation forecast at that horizon should
always be at target. Once again, there would be very little variability in the inﬂation forecast over
the inﬂation targeting period, and the estimated coefﬁcient on inﬂation would be insigniﬁcant.
Goodhart creates an ‘ex ante’ forecast, that prevailed before the preceding interest rate decision,
by adding on to the ex post forecast the estimated responses of inﬂation and output to the
implemented interest rate change.19
Here we update the dataset by Goodhart for the period 1997Q1-2006Q3, applying the same
a d j u s t m e n t sa sh ed i dt oc r e a t et h ee xa n t ed a t a . 20 We estimate the following Taylor rule
it = c + απEtπt+τ + αyEtyt+τ + αiit−1 (15)
using ex post and ex ante data, as reported in Table 3, where the rows shows the results for
different time horizons (τ = 0 refers to the inﬂation report quarter, and τ = 8t ot h ef o r e c a s tt w o
years ahead). For the ex post data, the estimated coefﬁcient on inﬂation is insigniﬁcant, at most
horizons. The output gap coefﬁcient is insigniﬁcant at longer horizons. The coefﬁcient on lagged
interest rate is close to one, in all cases, and the overall ﬁt of the regression is not good,
especially at longer horizons. When the model is estimated using ex ante data, by contrast, the
estimated coefﬁcient on the lagged interest rate is equal to one for many of the horizons,
suggesting that the equation should be estimated in ﬁrst difference, rather than levels. At the
two-year horizon, however, the equation performs reasonably well. The estimated coefﬁcient on
inﬂation is positive, and borderline signiﬁcant. The coefﬁcient on the output gap is positive, but
not signiﬁcant. These results suggest a large degree of interest rate smoothing. The null
hypothesis that the coefﬁcient on lagged interest rates equals one cannot be rejected, however.
18Orphanides (2001) and Boivin (2005) use the Greenbook forecasts for the US, constructed under the assumption that the nominal
federal funds rate will remain unchanged over the next sixth to eighth quarter. Goodhart (2005) uses the constant interest-rate forecasts,
as published by the Bank of England.
19This means that the ex post and the ex ante forecasts are identical when interest rates are left unchanged, but differ when rates have
changed. The interest rate adjustments are based on a Bank of England MPC publication (Monetary Policy Committee, 1999), which
shows the estimated responses of inﬂation and output growth to an interest rate change.
20The bank publishes projections for inﬂation and output growth conditional on two different paths for the interest rate: a constant path
and a path based on market expectations. Here we focus on the ﬁrst of these.
14Since the results suggest that the ex ante equation should be estimated in ﬁrst difference, we
p r o c e e db ye s t i m a t i n gt h ef o l l o w i n ge q u a t i o n
 it = φπEtπt+τ + φyEtyt+τ + αiit−1 (16)
w h e r ew eh a v ea d d e dt h el a g g e di n t e r e s tr a t eo n the right-hand side to allow for interest rate
gradualism. The reason for this is that, since the results regarding interest rate smoothing are
sensitive to whether the equation is speciﬁed in levels or ﬁrst difference terms, we do not want to
impose a unit coefﬁcient on the lagged interest rate. If the data prefers a levels speciﬁcation to
the ﬁrst difference speciﬁcation, the estimated coefﬁcient on the lagged interest rate will be
signiﬁcantly different from zero. Table 4 reports the results for the ex ante data, estimated using
both OLS and an IV approach, to account for potential measurement issues. As reported in the
table, the coefﬁcient on inﬂation is positive at all horizons, and signiﬁcant for horizons over a
year. The output gap coefﬁcient is positive and signiﬁcant at all horizons except for the very
longest one. Judging from the R2 and the DW statistics, the model ﬁts the data the best at the
longer horizons (7-8 quarters ahead), where it is able to explain over 60% of interest rate changes,
with little evidence of serial correlation in the residual. The estimated coefﬁcient αi tends to be
insigniﬁcant, suggesting that the ﬁrst difference speciﬁcation is indeed suitable. We also ﬁnd that
the results based on the IV approach are similar to those obtained using OLS. Altogether, this
suggest that the MPC has responded by changing interest rates whenever the inﬂation forecast
has deviated from target at the relevant forecast horizon, with little evidence of gradualism.
2.2 Evidence from a monetary policy experiment
Whereas the Taylor rule analysis is useful for analysing monetary policy gradualism, it cannot
tell whether monetary policy has been inactive, in the sense that monetary policy responds too
slowly to shocks hitting the economy. In this section, we instead estimate a measure of monetary
policy when there is no incentive to reduce interest rate volatility and compare this to actual
monetary policy, to see whether there is any evidence for inaction.
2.2.1 The model
Consider the following speciﬁcation for Yt,
Yt = ZYt−1 + Cεt, (17)
15where Yt i sa( n · p) · 1 vector of endogenous variables, where n denotes the number of variables
and p the lag length, Z is a matrix of coefﬁcients and εt is a vector of structural disturbances,





= I. To identify the structural shocks (ie matrix C), we
use two different identiﬁcation procedures. We start by imposing a recursive Cholesky
factorisation, and order the variables such that Yt = (yt,πt,it). Under this ordering, yt is the
most exogenous variable, which cannot respond contemporaneously to any of the other variables.
Inﬂation only responds contemporaneously to real activity, whereas the policy rate it can respond
to both inﬂation and real activity. We also make the assumption that the policy rate only responds
to the output gap with a lag, reﬂecting the delay in published statistics.
T h ed r a w b a c kw i t ht h eC h o l e s k yi d e n t i ﬁcation is that some of the restrictions are stringent and
not based on theoretical considerations. For example, assuming a zero contemporaneous impact
of a monetary policy shock on output is inconsistent with a large class of general equilibrium
models. In order to check the robustness of the results, we consider an alternative identiﬁcation
procedure based on sign restrictions. As discussed by Peersman (2005), the advantage of this
approach is that zero constraints on the contemporaneous impact matrix are not necessary.
Instead, restrictions on the contemporaneous and lagged response of the model variables to the
structural shocks, which are often made implicitl y ,a r em a d em o r ee x p l i c i t .H e r ew ea s s u m et h a t
a positive monetary policy shock has a non-negative impact on the interest rate, and a
non-positive impact on the output gap. A positi v ed e m a n ds h o c kh a san o n - n e g a t i v ei m p a c to n
the interest rate and inﬂation, while a positive supply shock (in our trivariate model, this implies
ap o s i t i v es h o c kt oi n ﬂation) has a non-negative effect on inﬂation and the interest rates and a
non-positive effect on the output gap. These identifying assumptions are similar to those laid out
in Peersman (2005) and Castelnuovo and Surico (2006).21 The technical implementation of this
strategy is discussed in Peersman (2005) and Uhlig (1999), and will not be covered here. Note,
however, that we do not identify a unique structural VAR based on the sign restrictions. Instead,
the method provides us with a large number of estimates of the structural VAR (17) such that
they all fulﬁll the identifying conditions. For each structural VAR, we then solve for the optimal
policy.






21We thank Paolo Surico for making his program that identiﬁes the structural VAR using sign restrictions available to us.
16where the period loss function is Lt = π2
t + λy2
t and where the constraints of the economy are
g i v e nb yt h es t r u c t u r a lV A R(17). This speciﬁcation of the loss function means that the central
bank does not have any preferences for reducing interest rate volatility, per se.
To solve the model, it is convenient to express it in state-space form as





ηt = Cεt, and it is the instrument of the central bank. The model can be solved using standard
techniques (eg Rudebusch and Svensson (1999)). The solution implies that, in any period t, the
policy rule it can be expressed as a function of the state of the economy, it = FXt, where F will
depend on the dynamics of the economy and the parameters in the central bank’s loss function.
2.2.2 Estimating the model
We estimate a trivariate VAR containing a measure of the output gap (yt deﬁned as the deviation
of output from trend, where trend is estimated using a HP ﬁlter), the deviation of inﬂation from
its target (πt) and the nominal interest rate (it) for the period 1994Q1-2007Q2.22 All variables
are expressed in terms of deviations from the mean before estimating the model. As was
discussed in section 2, we reject the hypothesis of a unit root for the output gap and the deviation
of inﬂation from target, but not for the nominal interest rate. Since the power of the test is low
when the sample is small, we continue to assume that it is stationary.
We solve the model under the assumption that the central bank only cares about inﬂation and
output stabilisation, where the relative weight on the output gap, λ, equals 0.5. The one
step-ahead forecast for the estimated policy-rule based on the Choleski decomposition is shown
in Chart 2, together with the actual policy rate. Judging from the chart, the predicted interest rate
tracks the actual rate reasonably well. Table 5 shows the proportion of quarters in the sample
when interest rate movements are classed as continuations, reversals and no change, for actual
data (column 1) and the predicted interest rate rule obtained under this identiﬁcation scheme
(column 2), where interest rate movements in any quarter (actual or predicted) between plus and
minus 0.125 basis points is classiﬁed as a no change decision.23
22To increase the number of observations, we extend the sample period to 1994 for this exercise. We refer to this period as the inﬂation
targeting period.
23Interest rate changes tend to be made in steps of 0.25 basis points whereas the interest rate changes in the model can take any size. To
control for this, we classify any interest rate change less than 0.125 as a no change decision.
17As reported in columns 1 and 2, the proportion of continuations under actual policy (0.46) is very
close to predicted (0.44), but there are fewer reversals than predicted (0.15 vs 0.26) and more no
change decisions (0.38 vs 0.30). These results differ from those by Martin and Salmon (1999),
shown in columns 4-5 in the table.24 In their study, they ﬁnd that over the time period 1981-1996
(the ‘pre-MPC period’), the proportion of reversals is small compared to that predicted from the
model, whereas the proportions of continuations and no change decisions are much larger.
The table reveals that the proportion of continuations estimated by the model has not changed
much between the pre-MPC period and the MPC period. By contrast, the actual proportion of
continuations has fallen markedly. Since gradualism would result in a high proportion of
continuations, this suggest that monetary policy has become less gradual during the MPC period.
In fact, the results give little evidence that policy has been more gradual than it should be, given
t h ed y n a m i c so ft h ee c o n o m y .
Turning to reversals, the results suggest that both the predicted and the actual proportion of
reversals has fallen between the two time periods. And, as reported in columns 6 and 8 in the
table, there is less evidence of deviation between predicted and actual policy during the MPC
period, since the proportion of reversals is closer to its predicted level during that period. At the
same time, both the actual and predicted proportion of no change decisions has increased, but
policy is now closer to that prescribed by the model than it was during the pre-MPC period.
Altogether, this suggests that, although there is still some evidence of policy being inactive, there
is markedly less inaction than in the past.
We note that the difference in results is unlikely to reﬂect differences in the methods used to
estimate and solve for the predicted policy rule – our method is very similar to that used by
Martin and Salmon (1999), as reported in Goodhart (1999).25 Their identiﬁcation scheme
(Choleski), and choices of model parameters are similar to those used here. The difference in
results may therefore reﬂect the fact that earlier work studied monetary policy prior to the
formation of the MPC, when both inﬂation and output were considerably more volatile.
24As reported by Goodhart (1999).
25The main difference is that they include the period 1990-92 in their sample, when the UK had an ofﬁcial exchange rate target. For this
reason, they include the exchange rate in the policy-maker’s objective function, and also in the VAR. We choose not to include the
exchange rate in the analysis since we only estimate the model over the period 1994-2007, when the UK did not have an exchange rate
target.
18Column 3 reports the results when the model is identiﬁed using sign restrictions, based on the
mean of the results across all solutions, where each solution is such that the identiﬁcation of the
structural VAR satisfy the sign restrictions discussed above.26 The results differ somewhat from
those in column 1; there are fewer continuations and more no change decisions. By contrast, the
proportion of reversals is similar to that reported in column 1. Overall, however, these results
support the above conclusion that there is markedly less inaction during the MPC period,
compared to the period prior to the formation of the MPC.
3 Determinants of monthly activity rates
So far, the focus has been on gradualism and inactivity at the quarterly frequency. Since actual
monetary policy decisions are taken at the monthly frequency, we now analyse the monthly
activity rate, deﬁned as the probability that the committee vote to change interest rates in a given
monetary policy meeting, and relate it to factors that may affect the degree of inaction and/or
gradualism. We begin by examining the monthly activity rate of the MPC as a whole, and where
relevant compare this to the activity rates of other countries with similar monetary policy
frameworks. The UK data also allow us to study how the activity rate varies across individual
committee members, and whether any differences appear to be systematically related to
members’ individual characteristics. All data in this section cover the period since the
establishment of the MPC (June 1997) until April 2007.
3.1 How active is the MPC and what determines its activity rate?
We analyse the monthly activity rate of the MPC, where the activity rate (at)i sd e ﬁned as the
probability that the committee vote to change interest rates in a given monetary policy meeting.
Interest rate changes tend to be made in steps of 0.25 basis points. Under the assumption that the
committee follows a Taylor rule, with no gradualism and no inaction, we would have
at = P (| it| ≥ 0.25) = P
bn nαπ πt + αy yt
n n ≥ 0.25
c
(19)
where P (·) denotes the probability of a given event. By contrast, if there is inaction and/or
gradualism, the activity rate would not be well described by (19); With gradualism, one would
need to include the lagged interest rate change in the expression above. If monetary policy was
inert, factors that affects the degree of inaction would need to be included in the model, or the
threshold variable would need to be greater than 0.25.
26The median solution gives a very similar picture.
19The economic data released at the monthly frequency tends to be volatile and is likely to get
revised. For this reason, it is difﬁcult to estimate (19) directly. Instead, this section looks at
changes in the activity rate over time, and relates them to factors that affect the degree of
gradualism and/or inaction. We begin by using simple statistical analysis to establish some
stylised facts about the activity rate, and conclude by estimating an empirical model that controls
for changes in the state of the economy.
3.1.1 Has the activity rate changed over time?
Table 6 shows the probability of the committee being active by year since its establishment,
whilst Chart 3 shows the same data but on a rolling 12 month basis. Although the activity rate is
volatile, it appears to be on a downward trend.
Under the assumption that the activity rate is well described by (19), the fall in the activity rate
over time would be related to improved economic stability and the consequent need for smaller
and fewer interest rate changes.27 There could be other reasons for the downward trend in
activity, however. Previous work suggests that parameter uncertainty can account for part of the
gradualism observed in interest rate movements. If parameter uncertainty falls as the MPC
becomes more experienced, we would expect monetary policy to become less gradualist over
time, which is likely to reduce the activity rate.28 A c t i v i s mm a ya l s of a l lo v e rt i m ei fi n ﬂation
expectations become more entrenched as the MPC builds a ‘track record’ for achieving the
inﬂation target.29 Empirical work by Blinder and Morgan (2000) also suggests that experience
m a yl e a dt oag r e a t e ra p p r e c i a t i o no ft h ev a l u eo fw a i t i n gf o rn e wi n f o r m a t i o n .U n d e rt h e
assumption that the MPC has become more experienced over time, this would lead to a
downward trend in activity rates.
27As noted by King (2007) ‘There is some indication that the number of [Bank Rate] changes was lower in the second than in the ﬁrst
ﬁve-year [MPC] period. But that reﬂected the size and nature of the shocks over the respective periods’.
28Under gradualism, a given policy change is implemented over a series of months rather than in one go, thus increasing the degree of
activism.
29This idea is put forward in the minutes of the MPC meeting in March 1999. The minutes note that ‘it was possible that there were
signs, for example in the conﬁdence surveys, of a more rapid response to changes in interest rates than there had been in the past. One
possible explanation was that the new monetary policy regime provided greater conﬁdence in the commitment to the inﬂation target
which was consistent with the fall in inﬂation expectations [...].’
203.1.2 Is the MPC more active in a forecast round?
Table 7 shows that the MPC has a strong tendency to be more active during the forecast round,
and this trend has become more pronounced in the latter half of the sample period.
Lomax (2005) notes that the committee may wait until the forecast round to act because although
macroeconomic data accrues fairly evenly through the quarter, during the forecast round the
members take a full and comprehensive review of how this data reﬂects the outlook.30 Related to
this Barker (2007) notes that the reconsideration of the performance of the Bank’s model during
the forecast round allows the Committee to learn about how the behaviour of the economy may
have changed. In addition, the committee may wait for the forecast round to change interest rates
if they judge it to be easier to communicate and explain the policy change in the context of the
Inﬂation Report.
The tendency for the MPC to be more active during the forecast round could be related to the
Bank’s use of the forecast as a main tool for communication. Cross-country comparison shows
that of seven other comparable central banks three also tend to be more active during their
respective equivalents to the forecast round and two of these also use the forecast as the main tool
for communication (Table 8).31 Although this may suggest a link from the institutional role of the
forecast to the activity rate during the forecast round, the table also shows that some of the
central banks that use the forecast as their main tool for communication do not show a tendency
to act more often in the forecast round.
3.1.3 Does the MPC show a bias towards one direction of change?
Comparing the average period of inactivity prior to a rate cut and a rate rise shows that although
the MPC has waited on average 0.8 months longer prior to lowering rates, this bias is not
statistically signiﬁcant (Table 9). The results also suggest that there is no pattern across central
banks of industrialised countries towards more delay prior to moving interest rates in one
direction.
30Indeed, the committee members may postpone activity until a forecast round if they are uncertain about the full impact of the new data
on the economy, and the MPC minutes highlight a few incidence where this appears to have been the case. For example, the minutes for
the July 2006 meeting read ‘But there was considerable uncertainty about the National Accounts estimates for 2005, which had yet to be
balanced. It was difﬁcult to reach a ﬁrm conclusion about the implications of the revisions for the overall balance of demand and supply
until the data had been fully analysed in the context of the Inﬂation Report round.’
31The seven other comparable central banks are those of Australia, Canada, the ECB, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and the US.
21In contrast, the literature presents arguments as to why inaction may be asymmetric, in the sense
that central banks tend to wait longer to raise than to cut interest rates, or vice versa. Our results,
however, suggest that inaction is not asymmetric, and either any biases are not relevant for the
respective central bank, or biases in opposite directions tend to offset each other.
3.1.4 Is the MPC averse to reversing the direction of interest rate changes?
We use three methods to investigate the frequency of interest rate reversals. First we consider the
probabilities that given a central bank is active it moves interest rates in the same and opposite
direction to the previous rate change (deﬁned a ‘continuation’ and ‘reversal’ respectively).
Second, we consider the average number of inactive meetings before a central bank continues and
reverses the path of interest rates, and third we compare the probability that action is immediately
followed by a continuation to the probability that it is immediatelyf o l l o w e db yar e v e r s a l .F o rt h e
MPC the probability of an action being a reversal is much lower than the probability of an action
being a continuation (0.18 and 0.82 respectively). Similarly, the MPC has on average waited 6.8
months before making a reversal compared to only 1.6 months before making a continuation.
Consistent with these ﬁndings, there is a probability of 0.3 that an active decision will be
followed in the next meeting by a continuation, but in no instances in the sample was action
immediately followed by a reversal. Hence, by all measures the MPC is much more inclined to
make policy continuationst h a np o l i c yr e v e r s a l s .Cross-country comparison suggests that this
t r e n di sc o m m o nt oa l lc e n t r a lb a n k sw i t hs i m i lar monetary policy frameworks (Table 10).
That the frequency of interest rate reversals is lower than that of continuations is often taken as
evidence for inaction. However, we show above that, based on quarterly data, the MPC’s
tendency to make more continuations than reversals is consistent with the path of monetary
policy suggested by the model with no interest rate smoothing, though it tends to make slightly
fewer reversals than this model suggests. Although it is not possible to make a direct link to the
monthly frequency, the results based on the monthly data suggest some evidence for inaction at
that frequency.
Arguments for why central banks may choose to be inactive include the fact that frequent interest
rate reversals may weaken the pass-through from changes in the Bank Rate to changes in market
interest rates at the long end of the yield curve, potentially reducing the impact of future Bank
22Rate changes on the economy.32 Increased uncertainty over future short-term rates may also lead
to greater volatility in ﬁnancial markets. Goodhart (1999) draws attention to the negative media
response and consequent loss in credibility central banks have received following interest rate
reversals.33 He also suggests that the greater uncertainty over the outlook faced at turning points
in the economic cycle maybe why central banks wait longer to reverse the direction of rates,
whilst Ellison (2006) suggests that frequent reversals may make learning about the monetary
policy transmission mechanism more difﬁcult.
3.1.5 Estimation results
So far, we have established some stylized facts about the monthly activity rate, and discussed
reasons for why movements in the activity rate may capture changes in gradualism and/or
inaction. This section complements that analysis, by estimating a simple empirical model for the
activity rate, where we also control for changes in the state of the economy. To evaluate whether
there is gradualism and/or inaction at the monthly frequency, we would like to estimate (19)
directly. However, monthly data is noisy and like l yt og e tr e v i s e d ,a n dM P Cm e m b e r sa r el i k e l y
to use a range of indicators to inform themselves about the state of the economy in their monthly
MPC meeting. For this reason, we instead estimate the following model
yt = α + βXt + εt (20)
where the dependent variable yt is a dummy variable (action) that takes the value one if the
committee voted to change interest rates and zero otherwise, and Xt is a vector of explanatory
variables that contains two types of variables: Those that proxy for the state of the economy, and
those that are likely to be related to movements i nt h ea c t i v i t yr a t eo v e rt i m e .T h ec h o i c eo ft h e
latter is based on the discussion above and includes a linear time trend (time), a dummy variable
for whether the vote is in a forecast round or not ( forecast) and a measure of the uncertainty
around the forecast (uncert) to proxy for changes in economic stability.34 We also include a
dummy variable that indicates whether the next active decision is to raise or cut interest rates (up
takes the value of one if the next active decision is to raise rates, and zero otherwise), and one
32See discussion of Woodford (1999) in Section 1.
33For example: ‘Critics ... described the Bank’s apparent shift in policy as ‘almost laughable” (The Times, 11 June 1998), and ‘where the
committee lost its credibility last week is in its inconsistency ... It suggests a ﬁckle committee inﬂuenced by the latest anecdotal or
statistical evidence’ (in ‘The ﬁckleness of hawks today and doves tomorrow’, the Sunday Business, 7 June 1998).
34The uncertainty measure captures the width of the fan charts published in the inﬂation reports. As a starting point, the width is based on
the actual dispersion of outturns around the forecast over the preceding 10 years. The MPC then judges whether uncertainty looking
forward is likely to be greater or less than that over the past, and modiﬁes the fan chart accordingly. The variability of inﬂation and output
growth has fallen substantially since the mid-1990. As a result, the degree of uncertainty has tended to fall over time.
23that indicates whether the next active decision continues the decision made the last time interest
r a t e sw e r ec h a n g e d ,o rw h e t h e ri tr e v e r s e si t( rev takes the value of one if the next decision is to
reverse the last decision, and zero otherwise). To control for the state of the economy, we include
am e a s u r eo fi n ﬂation expectations (inflexp), as proxied by the four year ahead inﬂation
expectations estimated using index-linked bonds.35 In addition, we include the absolute deviation
from target of the mean and the mode inﬂation forecast at the one year horizon (mean, mode).36
We also include a range of monthly indicators, including the unemployment rate, industrial
production, the CIPS manufacturing new orders survey, the CBI producer price survey and the
absolute deviation of inﬂation from target. In line with equation (19), we enter these variables in
terms of the absolute value of their ﬁrst differences. Since the dependent variable is a dummy
variable, the model is estimated using a probit model, with the estimated parameters presented in
Table 11.
Regression (1) conﬁrms the result that the activity rate has fallen over time, and that it is higher
in a forecast month than in a non-forecast month. Regression (2) includes the uncertainty
measure, to control for changes in economic stability. An increase in uncertainty has a large and
positive impact on the activity rate. Controlling for this variable also means that the time trend
becomes insigniﬁcant. This suggests that the fall in the activity rate is driven by economic
factors, rather than by changes in gradualism and/or inaction.
Regression (3) includes a larger set of variables in the regression to control for changes in the
state of the economy and additional factors that are likely to affect the activity rate. Uncertainty
remains signiﬁcant, and the activity rate is signiﬁcantly lower when the next move of the
committee is to reverse the previous decision. By contrast, whether the next decision is to raise or
cut interest rates does not affect the activity rate. The regression conﬁrms the result that the
importance of the forecast round has increased over time, as captured by the positive coefﬁcient
on the time· fo recastinteraction term. We also let the forecast term interact with uncertainty,
b u tf o u n dt h a ti tw a sn o ts i g n i ﬁcant. This suggests that the upward trend in activity levels during
forecast rounds is not related to the increase in economic stability, but that it has been driven by
other factors. In addition, an increase in the absolution deviation of (the mean) of forecasted
inﬂation from its target increases the probability of changing rates. We found that the absolute
35We focus on four-year ahead inﬂation expectations since this is the shortest maturity at which data for index-linked bonds are available
for the whole sample period.
36We also include the mean and the mode output growth forecasts, but ﬁnd that these do not enter signiﬁcantly into the regression
equation.
24value of the change in the unemployment rate or in the two surveys (CIPS and CBI) had no
explanatory power for the activity rate, so these variables were not included in the regression
equation. By contrast, the measure of industrial production (indprod), and the deviation of
current inﬂation from target were marginally signiﬁcant (infldev).
Regression (4) excludes variables that are not signiﬁcant. The equation explains around one third
of the variation in the activity rate. Finally, regression (5) includes the ﬁrst lag of action to see if
there is evidence of interest rate gradualism at the monthly frequency, but the estimated
coefﬁcient is insigniﬁcant.37
To sum up, the results suggest that the fall in activity is mainly driven by economic stability.
There is some evidence for inaction at the monthly frequency, reﬂe c t e db yt h ef a c tt h a tt h eM P C
is more active in the forecast month than in the non-forecast month. The importance of the
forecast round has also increased over time, and this increase appears to be unrelated to increased
economic stability. We ﬁnd that the activity rate is lower before an interest rate reversal than
before a continuation, and the results suggest that this difference has not been driven by a
tendency for interest rate gradualism. There is no evidence that the MPC waits longer for a raise
than a cut.
3.2 How does the behaviour of the MPC compare to that of its individual members?
We next compare individual activity rates to those of the committee to see whether the use of a
committee, rather than an individual, for monetary policy decision making can explain some of
the inaction at the monthly frequency. To do so, we start by establishing some facts about how
the activity rate of the MPC differs to that of its individual members, and how the degree of
activism differs between the individual members. We then estimate the model using panel data
a n a l y s i s .T h i sa l l o w su st o identify factors that inﬂuence the activity rate across members, at a
given point in time.
3.2.1 Is the MPC less active than its individual members?
We compare the probabilities of the MPC and its individual members being active, where the
probabilities for individual members are conditional on them having voted with the majority of
37We also include the second and third lags of action, but none of these variables enter signiﬁcantly.
25the Committee at the previous meeting. This conditionality is necessary to enable a fair
comparison to be made.38 Charts 4 and 5 show the probability that the committee and its
members voted for a change including and excluding the condition that they voted with the
majority last period, and Table 12 summarises the data. The conditional data suggest that on
average there is no statistical difference between the activity rates of the committee and its
individual members.39 The charts highlight that the difference in activity rates between individual
members is large, with the conditional probabilities varying from 0.11 to 0.86. However,
removing the top and bottom quartiles leaves a fairly small range of 0.23 to 0.36, and the median
and mean are fairly close together suggesting little skew in the data. Differences across
individual activity rates may be due to different perceptions of the impact of an interest rate
change on inﬂation and output, or differences in the horizon over which members prefer to bring
inﬂation back to target. Some members may also feel greater uncertainty regarding the economic
outlook, or respond differently to this uncertainty.40
That the committee is as active as its individual members suggests that the use of a committee for
monetary policy decision making has not increased the degree of inaction and/or gradualism in
UK monetary policy. Indeed, if we examine the four periods over the life of the committee when
it has been inactive for eleven months or more, only in the ﬁrst of these was the proportion of
dissenting members (members voting against the majority) above average, in the other three the
proportion of dissenting votes was the same or below the sample average. This suggests that the
inactivity was due to economic factors rather than committee inaction.
That the use of a committee decision making procedure does not appear to increase inaction
relative to an individual decision making procedure may be because as noted by Sibert (2006),
the structure of the MPC – with majority voting and no attempt at consensus, published minutes
that allow external scrutiny and the presence of external members – helps to reduce the extent to
which the committee’s decision will differ from the mean of individuals’ decisions. It is also
consistent with the outcome of a policy experiment by Blinder and Morgan (2000) which ﬁnds
that committees do not make decisions more slowly than individuals, but in contrast to ﬁndings
38It is necessary to account for this in order to compare the activity rates of individuals with the committee and the activity rates of
individuals across the sample. Individuals that did not vote with the majority in the previous meeting may vote for a change even if the
most recent vintage of data contains no news because they believe that interest rates were not set at the right level at the previous
meeting. Not accounting for this will bias the activity rates of individual members who consistently voted against the decision of the
committee upwards.
39As under majority voting the committee’s interest rate decision is the median vote of its individual members it is possible that the
committee’s activity rate may differ to the sample the mean of its individual member’s activity rates.
40See Bhattacharjee and Holly (2006).
26from a similar experiment by Lombadelli et al. (2002).41
3.2.2 Do individual members show a greater tendency to be more active in a forecast round?
Table 7 shows that individual members also show a tendency to be more active in the forecast
round, although for them the tendency is less pronounced than for the committee as a whole and
has not become more evident in the latter part of the sample period.42 The data also show that
this tendency is more pronounced for internal members than external members.
3.2.3 Does individual member activity decline in their second ‘term’?
Comparing the probabilities of members being active in their ﬁrst three years on the MPC to
thereafter (deﬁned as ‘ﬁrst term’ and ‘second term’) shows that the activity rate of members in
their ﬁrst term is 0.1pp higher than in the second term, and this difference is statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1% level.43
As discussed above, if the committee faces less uncertainty as time progresses it should become
less gradualist and therefore also less active. This principle could apply to individual members as
well as the Committee. In a monetary policy experiment Blinder and Morgan (2000) ﬁnd that
both committees and individuals ‘learn to wait’ for more data before making a decision as the
experiment progressed, which is consistent with the results reported above. However, the decline
in individual member activity could also be driven by changes in the overall activity rates over
time, something we try to control for below using panel data analysis.
3.2.4 Are internal members more active than external members?
The activity rates of external members tend to be higher than those of internal members. If only
members that voted with the majority in the previous round are considered the difference is
41On the theoretical side, Gerlach-Kristen (2006) argue the opposite, that as individuals are less certain about potential output, they attach
more weight to past observations, and are thus less active than the committee. Although we ﬁnd no evidence to support this, our data
does not offer a strictly fair comparison as members have the opportunity to discuss the data with the committee, thus increasing their
information set prior to voting.
42That the tendency to be more active in a forecast round is higher for the committee than its individual members implies that the whilst
the forecast increases the probability of the median voter being active, it may not increase the probability of all members on the
committee being active.
43The sample was divided into members’ votes during their ﬁrst three years on the committee and thereafter rather than ofﬁcial terms to
avoid problems associated with members having terms of different lengths and some internal members terms having started before the
establishment of the committee.
270.02pp, and statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level. However, if we do not account for whether
m e m b e r sw e r ei nt h em a j o r i t yi nt h ep r e v i o u sr o u n dt h ed i f f e r e n c ei sm u c hl a r g e ra t0 . 0 8 p pa n d
this is signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Accounting for the conditionality makes a large difference
because external members have a lower probability of being in the majority than internal
members (0.82 compared to 0.92 for internal members).44
There is little theoretical work on whether externals or internals are likely be more active. In an
empirical study, Battacharjee and Holly (2006) ﬁnd that the external members are more
responsive than the internal members to a deviation of forecast inﬂation from target, which in
some cases would cause them to be more active. Gerlach-Kristen (2007) also ﬁnds that the
dissenting votes of external members contain information about the future direction of monetary
policy, whilst the dissenting votes of internal members do not, which is consistent with externals
being more active than internals.
3.2.5 Are individual members more or less averse to interest rate reversals?
In addition to the arguments for why the committee may be more averse to interest rate reversals
than continuations, individual members may also be averse to voting to move rates in the
opposite direction to their own previous vote due to concerns over their individual reputation.
Table 13 shows the probability that individual members and the committee vote to
continue/reverse the previous active decision of the committee (given that they act) and the
probability they vote to continue/reverse their own previous active decision (given that they act).
We would expect individuals to be more likelyt ov o t et or e v e r s et h ec o m m i t t e e ’ sp r e v i o u s
decision than the committee as a whole, as they may not have supported this decision. The data
shows that this tends to be the case, however if an outlier is excluded from the sample the
probability of the MPC and its individual members voting to reverse the direction of monetary
policy is the same.45 For the same reason we would expect that individual members are more
likely to vote to reverse the MPC’s previous decision than their own, and the results show that
44Gerlach-Kristen (2007) proposes that internals have a higher probability of voting with the majority because a) as they are in contact
with each other more than external members an organisational consensus may form and b) disagreeing with other internal colleagues may
be potentially damaging to their future career path. Given the internal members form a majority any ‘internal consensus’ would leave
them on the winning side of an interest rate decision. In contrast, outsiders may ﬁnd that the media attention gained from dissenting helps
to raise their public proﬁle and may promote their post-MPC career.
45For the outlier (Walton) the probability of voting to reverse the direction of interest rates (given that he acted) is one, compared to 0.33
for the member with the next highest probability. The high probability of Walton voting for a reversal is partly due to his short time on
the committee.
28this is the case.
3.2.6 Panel data analysis
Next, we estimate a simple empirical model using panel data analysis. Whereas the focus of the
time series analysis was whether there was any evidence for inaction or gradualism for the MPC
as a whole, here we take the degree of inaction/gradualism for the MPC as given, and focus on
differences in the activity rate across members. We estimate the following equation
yit = αi + β1Xit + εit (21)
where subindex i denotes member i and where αi is included to control for ﬁxed effects. The
dependent variable yit (action) is a dummy variable that takes the value of one when a member
votes for a rate change, and zero otherwise. The explanatory variables included in the vector Xit
are based on the above discussion, and contain two types of variables; Those that are common
across members of the committee, and those that differ across members. The former include a
linear time trend (time), a measure of the uncertainty around the forecast (uncert), a measure of
inﬂation expectations (mean, mode) and dummy variables that take the value of one if the vote
is in a forecast round ( forecast), if the committee’s next active decision is to raise interest rates
(up), and if the committee’s next active decision reverses the last decision (rev). As
individual-speciﬁc variables, we include dummy variables that take the value of one if the
member is internal (internal), if the member has served more than three years (term), if the
member voted with the majority of the committee in the previous meeting (pastmaj). We also
u s ed u m m yv a r i a b l e st od i s t i n g u i sh between members’ backgrounds (academic, business,
finance and public), and let some of the variables interact. The model is estimated using panel
data analysis, as shown in Table 14.
Regression (1) conﬁrms that individual members are more like l yt ob ea c t i v ei naf o r e c a s tr o u n d ,
when uncertainty is high, and when the member is an external (as reﬂe c t e db yt h en e g a t i v e
coefﬁcient on internal). There is no evidence that individual activity rates have fallen over time
when we control for the level of uncertainty, suggesting that the fall in individual’s activity rates
can be explained by economic factors, rather than changes in the degree of gradualism and /or
inaction. Another result is that, once we control for whether a member is internal or external, the
length of time served on the committee has no signiﬁcant impact on the activity rate, reﬂecting
the fact that internals tend to serve longer on the committee than the externals, and also tend to be
less active. This result suggests that members do not ‘learn’ to wait for new information (as
29s u g g e s t e db yB l i n d e ra n dM o r g a n( 2 0 0 0 ) ) .
Regression (2) excludes the variable term but controls for whether members voted with the
majority in the past meeting (pastmaj). The estimated coefﬁcient is negative, which shows that
m e m b e r sa r el e s sl i k e l yt ob ea c t i v ei ft h e ya g r e e dw i t ht h ec o m m i t t e e ’ sd e c i s i o ni nt h ep r e v i o u s
meeting. We also ﬁnd that, although the estimated coefﬁcient on internal is still signiﬁcant, the
difference in activity rates across internal and external members falls once we control for
pastmaj.T h i sr e ﬂects the fact that external members have a lower probability of having voted
with the majority in the previous period, and therefore are more likely to be active than internals.
Regression (3) shows that individual members are less likely to be active when the next decision
of the committee is to reverse the last decision, compared to a continuation. By contrast, the
activity rate is not signiﬁcantly affected by whether the next active decision is to raise or cut
interest rates.
Regression (4) excludes the variable internal and instead includes the background of the
individual members. The results suggest that members with experience of academia are more
active than those with other backgrounds. In fact, when we include both internal and
academia, variable internal no longer enters signiﬁcantly (regression (5)). To some extent, this
captures the fact that externals are more likely to have an academic background compared to
internals.46 However, since academia remains signiﬁcant, this suggests that the difference in
activity rates across internals and externals may be related to their different backgrounds.47
To better understand the difference between internals and externals, we also interact the internal
dummy variable with some of the explanatory variables that mattered for the activity rate:
fo recast, uncert and mean, as shown in regression (6). Internals tend to be more active when
uncertainty is high (capturing a stronger tendency to act in the beginning of the sample period),
when forecast inﬂation deviates from target,48 and when the next decision is to raise interest
rates.49
4664% of externals have experience in academia, and 27% of internals.
47Previous related work ﬁnds that members with experience of academia do not show a tendency to vote for higher or lower interest rates
than other members (Gerlach-Kristen (2007)) and that career backgrounds have no signiﬁcant effect on members tendency to cast
dissenting votes (Spencer (2006)).
48By contrast, Harris and Spencer (2007) and Brooks, Harris and Spencer (2007) ﬁnd that that external members are more responsive to
deviations of the inﬂation forecast from target than internal members.
49This is consistent with Spencer and Harris (2007) and Gerlach-Kristen (2007) who ﬁnd that internal members show a preference for
30To sum up, these results suggest that, similar to the committee, individual members are more
active in a forecast round and when uncertainty is high. Also, they are less likely to be active
before an interest rate reversal, compared to a continuation. We ﬁnd some difference in activity
rates across members. In particular, internals tend to be less active than externals, despite being
more responsive to deviations of the inﬂation forecast from target. Internals also tend to be more
active before an interest rate rise, compared to a cut. Some of the difference between internals
and externals appears to be related to their background - externals are more likely to have an
academic background, and members with an academic background tend to be more active.
4C o n c l u s i o n s
Standard estimates of the Taylor rule suggest that monetary policy responds gradually to
movements in inﬂation and the output gap. There is strong evidence that the model is
misspeciﬁed, however. We account for this by addressing various measurement issues, and also
allow for the fact that policy-makers may respond to variables not included in the Taylor rule.
When doing so, there is little evidence for interest rate gradualism. To evaluate whether there is
evidence for inaction we estimate a measure of monetary policy when there is no incentive for
the MPC to reduce interest rate volatility and compare it with actual policy. The main result is
that, although there is some evidence that monetary policy has been inert over the MPC period,
there is markedly less inaction than previous work suggested. This may reﬂect the fact that
earlier work looked at monetary policy prior to the formation of the MPC, when both inﬂation
and output were considerably more volatile. In line with the Taylor rule results, this exercise also
suggests that there is little evidence that policy has been more gradual than it should be at the
quarterly frequency, given the dynamics of the economy.
However, there is some evidence for inaction at the monthly frequency, indicated by the tendency
of the committee to be more active in the forecast round. The importance of the forecast round
has increased over time, and this increase appears not to be related to increased economic
stability. There is no evidence that the MPC waits longer before a rate rise than a rate cut, but
they tend to wait longer before reversing the direction of interest rate changes. This difference
appears not to be driven by interest rate gradualism, and so provides some evidence for inaction
at the monthly frequency, in line with the results at the quarterly frequency. Any inaction in
higher interest rates.
31monetary policy does not appear to be related to the use of a committee, as the individual MPC
m e m b e r sa r en o tm o r ea c t i v et h a nt h eM P Ca saw h o l e . W ea l s oﬁnd that external members tend
to be more active than the internal members, despite the fact that internals tend to respond more
strongly to deviations of the inﬂation forecast from target.
32Appendix A: Tables and charts
TABLE 1: ESTIMATION RESULTS:S TANDARD TAYLOR RULES
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )( 7 )( 8 )
φπ 0.53** 1.24** 1.50** 0.60** 2.24 3.11 0.59** 0.10
(0.05) (0.53) (0.48) (0.27) (1.53) (2.39) (0.24) (0.42)
φy 0.40** 1.35** 1.57** 4.61* 3.29** 3.40** 3.12* 1.30*
(0.20) (0.38) (0.38) (2.35) (1.49) 1.53 (1.69) (0.79)
ρ 0.93** 0.87** 0.86** 0.90** 0.64**
(0.03) (0.05) (0.09) (0.04) (0.19)
c 5.76** 2.09 5.23** 0.33 0.56* 0.67** 0.50* 1.74*
(0.39) (1.29) (0.13) (0.22) (0.29) (0.43) (0.30) (0.97)
γ 0.19* 0.83**
(0.10) (0.17)
R2 0.47 0.27 0.34 0.94 0.92 0.92 0.94 0.96
DW 0.15 0.19 0.33 1.69 0.79 0.89 1.98 1.85
Obs 123 39 39 122 39 39 121 39
Sample 76Q1- 97Q1- 97Q1- 76Q1- 97Q1- 97Q1- 76Q1- 97Q1-
07Q2 07Q2 07Q2 07Q2 07Q2 07Q2 07Q2 07Q2
Notes: (1)-(5), (7)-(8) estimated using OLS, (6) estimated using IV (instruments:
lag 1-4 of the interest rate, inﬂation and the output gap). Standard errors in
parenthesis, based on the Newey-West heteroskedasticity and serial correlation
robust estimator.
TABLE 2: ESTIMATION RESULTS:B ACKWARD- AND FORWARD-
LOOKING TAYLOR RULES (1994Q1-2007Q2)
i - 101234
φπ 1.54 2.92* 3.62* 5.13* 7.12 9.81
(1.19) (1.47) (2.09) (3.04) (5.37) (10.20)
φy 2.61* 3.63** 4.14** 3.77* 3.01 1.41
(1.38) (1.29) (1.71) (1.95) (2.59) (3.97)
ρ 0.90** 0.84** 0.86** 0.88** 0.89** 0.91**
(0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
c 0.52 0.82** 0.70* 0.60 0.55 0.46
(0.45) (0.39) (0.38) 0.39 0.41 0.44
R2 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.89 0.87
DW 0.77 0.88 1.05 0.86 1.03 0.82
Obs 50 51 50 49 48 47
Notes: Estimated using IV. Instruments: Lag 1-4 of inﬂation,
the output gap, and the interest rate. Standard errors in
parenthesis based on the Newey-West heteroskedasticity
and serial correlation robust estimator.
TABLE 3: TA Y L O RR U L E SB A S E DO NE XP O S TA N DE XA N T ED A T A- LEVELS SPECIFICATION
Ex Post data Ex Ante data
τα π αy αi c R2 DW απ αy αi c R2 DW
8 -0.29 -0.20 0.92** 1.57 0.90 1.19 5.56 1.75 0.89* -1.35 0.91 1.11
7 -0.28 -0.18 0.91** 1.52 0.90 1.20 25.69 1.67 0.95** 0.09 0.96 1.61
6 1.52** 0.09 0.97** 0.15 0.96 1.61 52.11 3.37 0.97 0.15 0.96 1.61
5 -0.14 0.08 0.95 0.29 0.90 1.30 1130.953 858.84 1.00** -0.06 0.93 1.35
4 -0.00 0.35 1.07** -1.24 0.91 1.51 928.68 934.94 1.00** -0.06 0.93 1.49
3 0.06 0.51** 1.14** -2.19** 0.93 1.95 262.61 1126.24 1.00** -0.11 0.94 1.87
2 0.06 0.44** 1.06** 1.61** 0.94 2.14 81.99 1079.44 1.00** -0.10 0.95 1.98
1 0.02 0.35** 0.98** -0.82* 0.94 1.97 -1.01 22.90 0.98** -0.01 0.95 1.97
0 0.06 0.30** 0.89** -0.38 0.93 1.83 0.55 2.95** 0.90** 0.41** 0.93 1.83
Notes: Estimated using OLS. **(*) denotes signiﬁc a n ta tt h e5( 1 0 ) %l e v e l .T h eﬁrst column (τ)denotes quarter-ahead forecasts.
Sample period: 1997Q1-2007Q3.
33TABLE 4: TA Y L O RR U L E SB A S E DO NE XA N T ED A T A , FIRST DIFFERENCE SPECIFICATION
Lagged interest rate, OLS estimation Lagged interest rate, IV estimation
τα π αy αi R2 DW απ αy αi R2 DW
8 1.81** 0.00 -0.01 0.67 2.26 1.81** 0.15 0.03 0.96 2.03
7 1.53** 0.14** -0.01 0.64 1.63 1.63** 0.36* -0.01 0.63 1.39
6 0.79** 0.27** -0.00 0.33 1.38 1.08** 0.46** -0.01 0.36 1.39
5 0.48** 0.32** -0.00 0.32 1.32 0.65** 0.41** -0.01 0.44 1.47
4 0.35* 0.30** -0.00 0.33 1.33 0.49** 0.35** -0.01 0.44 1.48
3 0.11 0.30** -0.02 0.39 1.42 0.24 0.30** 0.01 0.42 1.54
2 0.04 0.34** -0.01* 0.49 1.76 0.18 0.33** -0.01 0.48 1.72
1 -0.02 0.35** -0.01* 0.52 1.97 0.16 0.37** -0.01 0.48 1.87
0 0.02 0.28** -0.02* 0.33 1.83 0.06 0.33 -0.01* 0.32 1.86
Notes: Estimated using OLS. **(*) denotes signiﬁc a n ta tt h e5( 1 0 ) %l e v e l .T h eﬁrst column (τ)denotes
quarter-ahead forecasts. Sample period: 1997Q1-2007Q3.
TABLE 5: ACTUAL AND  PREDICTED  INTEREST RATE CHANGES
Proportion of total interest rate decisions Ratio of actual to predicted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Actual Predicted Predicted Actual Predicted
(Cholesky) (SR) 1981-1998 1981-1998 (Cholesky) (SR) 1981-1998
Continuations 0.46 0.44 0.35 0.55 0.41 1.04 1.31 1.34
Reversals 0.15 0.26 0.24 0.24 0.58 0.58 0.60 0.41
No change 0.38 0.30 0.41 0.21 0.02 1.27 0.95 10.5
Notes: Column (2) and (6) use Cholesky decomposition to identify the structural VAR. Column (3) and (7) use sign restrictions.
Data in column (4), (5) and (8) are based on Goodhart (1999). A value of λ = 0.5 has been used to calculate predicted policy.
TABLE 6: PROBABILITY OF COMMITTEE ACTIVITY BY YEAR
P(Act)












11997 data are from June to December only
22007 data are from January to April only.
TABLE 7: PROBABILITY OF ACTIVITY BY FORECAST ROUND
P(act) P(act | forecast) P(act | no forecast) P-value1
Committee July 1997-April 2007 0.28 0.46 0.19 0.002
July1997-2001 0.40 0.56 0.32 0.101
2002-April 2007 0.17 0.38 0.07 0.002
Individual members2 July 1997-April 2007 0.30 0.36 0.19 0.000
July 1997-2001 0.41 0.47 0.30 0.000
2002-April 2007 0.17 0.29 0.10 0.000
External members 2 July 1997-April 2007 0.31 0.34 0.20 0.001
Internal members2 July 1997-April 2007 0.29 0.40 0.19 0.000
1P-value of a test for no statistical difference between P(act | forecast) and P(act | no forecast).
2Weighted average conditional on member having voted with the majority in the period before.
34TABLE 8: A COMPARISON OF ACTIVITY ACROSS CENTRAL BANKS
UK Australia Canada Euro New Norway Sweden US Mean
-area Zealand
P(Act per meeting) 0.28 0.19 0.50 0.22 0.45 0.38 0.35 0.46 0.32
Meetings per year 12 11 8 12 8 9 8 8 9.9
Average activity per year 3.4 2.1 4.1 2.6 3.6 3.3 3.0 3.8 2.9
Decision making process1 maj maj cons cons gov cons maj maj
Accountability2 ind coll coll coll gov coll ind ind
Members on committee 9 9 6 18 1 7 6 12 8.3
P(Act per meeting|forecast) 0.46 0.28 0.65 0.36 0.44 0.42 0.41 0.39 0.43
P(Act per meeting|no forecast) 0.19 0.14 0.39 0.18 0.44 0.35 0.31 0.44 0.31
P-value3 0.00 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.97 0.61 0.39 0.58
Forecasts per year 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 2 3.3
Forecast owner Comm Comm Staff Staff Gov Comm Staff Comm
Main policy tool for
communication Y Y Y N Y Y Y N
Sample period4 06/97- 06/97- 12/00- 01/99- 04/99- 01/01- 01/99- 06/97-
04/07 04/07 04/07 04/07 04/07 04/07 04/07 04/07
Sources: National central bank websites.
1Maj refers to majority voting, cons consensus decision making, and gov indicates that the Governor has the ﬁnal decision.
2If accountability is collective (coll) individual members decisions are not made public and all members defend the majority view.
If accountability is individual (ind) members votes are made available to the public. If the Governor makes the decision alone
(gov) then he is accountable.
3P-value of a test for nostatistical difference between P(act per meeting|forecast) and P(act per meeting|no forecast).
4Sample period is from June 1997 unless the respective central bank changed its policy making procedure after June 1997, in
which case only data since the structural break are analysed.
TABLE 9: AVERAGE MONTHS INACTIVITY PRIOR TO A RATE RISE/CUT
UK Australia Canada Euro- New Norway Sweden US Mean
area Zealand
Average months pre- raise 2.1 3.8 1.3 3.3 1.1 2.4 2.2 0.6 3
lower 2.9 3.3 0.6 3.6 1.3 0.4 1.9 1.7 2.3
P-value1 0.56 0.83 0.21 0.9 0.8 0.06 0.8 0.2
Sources: National central bank websites
1P-value of test for no statistical difference between the average wait pre-lower and average wait pre-raise.
Sample: June 1997-April 2007 unless the respective central bank changed its policy making procedure after
June 1997, in which case only data since the structural break are analysed.
TABLE 10: MEASURES OF THE WILLINGNESS OF CENTRAL BANKS TO MAKE INTEREST RATE REVERSALS/CONTINUATIONS
UK Australia Canada Euro- New Norway Sweden US Mean
area Zealand
P(Continuation | Act) 0.82 0.86 0.83 0.86 0.86 0.90 0.77 0.89 0.84
P(Reversal | Act) 0.18 0.14 0.17 0.14 0.14 0.10 0.23 0.11 0.17
Average months pre-continuation 1.6 3.7 0.6 1.8 0.8 0.5 1.7 0.4 1.6
-reversal 6.8 5.7 2.0 16.7 3.5 6.0 3.4 5.3 5.7
P(Continuation | Actt−1) 0.30 0.46 0.67 0.17 0.59 0.52 0.36 0.64 0.4
P(Reversal | Actt−1) 00 000 0 0 0 0
Sources: National central bank websites
Sample: June 1997-April 2007 unless the respective central bank changed its policy making procedure after June 1997, in
which case only data since the structural break are analysed.
35TABLE 11: TIME SERIES ESTIMATION
Dependent variable: Committee Action
12345
time -0.01** 0.00 0.00
fo recast 0.82** 0.85** 0.48
uncert 4.86** 6.35* 6.46** 6.84**
time· fo recast 0.02* 0.02** 0.02**
up -0.19
rev -1.35** -1.21** -1.31**
mode -2.25
mean 2.88** 1.24* 1.32*
inflexp 0.42
inﬂdev -1.89* -1.81* -1.96*
indprod -0.29 -0.28* -0.30*
action(−1) -0.32
constant -0.42 -3.45** -4.97** -3.94** -3.98**
R2 0.09 0.13 0.30 0.27 0.27
Notes: Estimated using binary probit model. **(*) denotes signiﬁcant
at the 5 (10)% level. Sample: July 1997-March 2007
TABLE 12: COMPARISON OF COMMITTEE AND INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS ACTIVITY LEVELS
Committee Individual members
Weighted Mean1 P-value2 Mean Median Max Min
P(Act|majorityt−1) 0.28 0.30 0.67 0.33 0.31 0.86 0.11
P(Act) 0.28 0.34 0.19 0.36 0.33 0.71 0.09
Sample: July 1997-April 2007
1The weight given to each individual member in the aggregation of their probabilities is proportional
to the number of meetings at which they voted
2P-value of test for no statistical difference between the activity rate of the committee and the
weighted average of its individual members.
TABLE 13: PROBABILITY OF VOTING FOR A REVERSAL OF A) THE COMMITTEE S AND B) MEMBER S PREVIOUS ACTIVE DECISION
Committee’s previous decision Own previous decision
P(Reverse|Act) P(Continuation|Act) P(Reverse|Act) P(Continuation|Act)
Bean 0.22 0.78 0.21 0.79
Clementi 0.14 0.86 0.14 0.86
George 0.13 0.87 0.13 0.87
Gieve 0.33 0.67 0.33 0.67
King 0.20 0.80 0.19 0.81
Large 0.15 0.85 0.08 0.92
Lomax 0.33 0.67 0 1
Plenderleith 0.14 0.86 0.14 0.86
Tucker 0.27 0.73 0.09 0.91
Vickers 0.12 0.88 0.13 0.87
Allsopp 0.11 0.89 0 1
Barker 0.28 0.72 0.16 0.84
Bell 0.10 0.90 0.22 0.78
Besley 0 1 0 1
Blanchﬂower 1 0 NA NA
Budd 0.14 0.86 0.17 0.83
Buiter 0.06 0.94 0.11 0.89
Goodhart 0.13 0.87 0.13 0.87
Julius 0.14 0.86 0.21 0.79
Lambert 0.29 0.71 0.33 0.67
Nickell 0.16 0.84 0.10 0.90
Sentance 0 1 0 1
Wadhwani 0.21 0.79 0.11 0.8
Walton 1 0 0.33 0.67
Weighted average 0.20 0.80 0.15 0.85
Weighted average (ex-Walton) 0.18 0.82 0.14 0.86
Committee 0.18 0.82 0.18 0.82
36TABLE 14: PANEL DATA ESTIMATION
Dependent variable: Individual Action
12345 6
fo recast 0.59** 0.59** 0.65** 0.59** 0.59** 0.62**
uncert 3.45** 3.60** 2.96** 3.62** 3.50** 1.45
internal -0.19** -0.14** -0.11 -0.13 -2.15**









int · fo recast 0.11
int · uncert 2.64**
int · mean 0.98**
int · aca 0.17
int · up 0.36*
int · rev 0.30
R2 0.07 0.11 0.16
Notes: Estimated using binary probit model. **(*) denotes signiﬁcant at the 5 (10)%
level. Sample: July 1997-March 2007




































Jun-98 Dec-99 Jun-01 Dec-02 Jun-04 Dec-05
Committee
Individual members
Individual members that voted with the majority
at the previous meeting
P (act)
Chart 4: Probability individual members act given they voted with the majority at the pre-
vious meeting (June 1997-April 2007)




























39Chart 5: Probability individual members act (June 1997-April 2007)
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